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Computing is a high-level process of a physical system. Recent interest in non-standard
computing systems, including quantum and biological computers, has brought this physical basis
of computing to the forefront. There has been, however, no consensus on how to tell if a given
physical system is acting as a computer or not; leading to confusion over novel computational
devices, and even claims that every physical event is a computation. In this paper we introduce
a formal framework that can be used to determine whether a physical system is performing a
computation. We demonstrate how the abstract computational level interacts with the physical
device level, in comparison to the use of mathematical models in experimental science. This
powerful formulation allows a precise description of experiments, technology, computation, and
simulation, giving our central conclusion: physical computing is the use of a physical system to
predict the outcome of an abstract evolution. We give conditions for computing, illustrated using
a range of non-standard computing scenarios. The framework also covers broader computing
contexts, where there is no obvious human computer user. We introduce the notion of a ‘com-
putational entity’, and its critical role in defining when computing is taking place in physical systems.
Keywords: computation, physical computation, computer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information science is one of the great advances of the last century. The technology that developed
from it is now integral to almost all aspects of day-to-day life in the developed world, and advances in
mobile telephone hardware have put a computer in (almost) every pocket. In addition to the prolifer-
ation of semiconductor-based computers, non-standard (also known as unconventional) computational
systems continue to be proposed and used – from the differential analysers of the early 20th century
[1], through to the recent explosion of interest in quantum computing [2, 3], and other proposals such
as quantum annealing [4], DNA [5, 6], or chemical [7, 8] computational devices. The notion of compu-
tation, and its related system property, information, has been imported into other fields in an attempt
to describe and explain such diverse processes as photosynthesis [9] and the conscious mind [10], and a
strand of modern cross-discipline thought has given us the claims that “everything is information” [11]
or “the universe is a [quantum] computer” [12].
In parallel with the technological and conceptual development of information science, its foundations
continue to be addressed. The definition of which mathematical, logical, and algorithmic structures
constitute ‘a computation’ is a topic of ongoing research (see for example [13, 14]). The question
of how to define information, both as a concept and a physical quantity, is being investigated by
philosophers, physicists, and informatics researchers (see for example [15]). In this paper we address a
third, equally important, and specifically physical, question: what is a computer? Given some notion
of a mathematical computation, what does it mean to say that some physical system is ‘running’ a
computation? If we want to use computational notions in physics, what are the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which we can say that a particular physical system is carrying out a computation? In
short – when does a physical system compute?
There is currently no accepted answer to this question, and an absence of a worked out formalism
within which to determine if a computation is happening physically gives rise to a great deal of confusion
when discussing non-standard forms of computation. We can all agree that a laptop running a Matlab
calculation and a server processing search engine queries are physical systems performing computation.
However, when we move beyond standard and mass-produced technology, the question becomes more
difficult to answer. Is a protein performing a compaction computation as it folds [16]? Does a photon
(quantum) compute the shortest path through a leaf in photosynthesis [17]? Is the human mind a
computer [18]? A dog catching a stick [19]? A stone sitting on the floor [20]? One answer is that they
all are – that everything that physically exists is performing computation by virtue of its existence.
Unfortunately, by thus defining the universe and everything in it as a computer, the notion of physical
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computation becomes empty. To state that every physical process is a computation is simply to re-
define what is meant by a ‘physical process’ – there is then no nontrivial content to the assertion. A
statement such as “everything is computation” is either false, or it is trivial; either way, it is not useful
in determining properties of physical systems in practice
In this paper we give a framework that can be used to determine whether a physical system is com-
puting or not. We define what it means for a physical system to compute a mathematically-defined
computation, how the physical and mathematical levels in computing interact, and give necessary con-
ditions for a physical system to be computing. Key to defining our framework is the representation
relation that is fundamental in the physical sciences, where physical systems are represented by math-
ematical objects. We show how such a representation allows comparisons to be made between physical
processes and mathematically-described computations, and how this can then be used to define when a
physical process is being used in such a relation. This requires, explicitly, the notion of a ‘computational
entity’ to be necessary for a computation to proceed: we define such entities, show how such a defini-
tion does not require either intention or a conscious (or human) user, and argue that such a contextual
notion of computation is not problematic for an account of a physically real process. In our framework,
computation shares formal and structural similarities with scientific experiments and engineering tech-
nology: we are able to show precisely how they are related, and give exact definitions for each in terms
of a single, underlying structure. In all cases, we are dealing with questions of representation: how is
a physical system represented mathematically, how do we test that representation, and how can the
representation be ‘reversed’ so that a physical system can instantiate a mathematical description. As
well as computation, these are key issues in how we determine between scientific theories by argument
and experiment; and, in turn, fit into broader questions of representation that are fundamental to a
number of different fields [21].
II. PHYSICAL COMPUTATION
The question of when a physical system is computing is fundamentally a question about the relation-
ship of abstract mathematical/logical entities to physical ones [22]. A ‘computation’ is a mathematical
abstraction described in one of the logical formalisms developed by theoretical computer scientists. A
‘computer’ is a physical system with actual constituent parts and its own internal interactions that take
it from one physical state to another. The computer is taken to stand in a certain relation to the com-
putation – if we can formulate this relation, then we can answer our question of when a physical system
is performing computation. To act as a computer is always to be performing a specific computation; we
therefore need to ask: when is this physical system performing that (not always known) computation,
and what is the relation required between the physical system and the abstract computation that this
can be determined?
The above gives us a view as in figure 1(a): there is a space of abstract mathematical/logical entities
and a space of physical entities. A computation is an entity in the first, and a putative computer in
the second. So what is it that allows us to go between the two spaces? There is no possible notion of
causation between them (this is simply a category error); so how does the abstract interact with the
physical at all?
To answer this, we turn to the area where the question of the relation between abstract and physical
has most commonly been posed: physics. Physics operates by representing physical systems abstractly,
using abstract theory to predict the outcome of physical evolution, and formulating physical experi-
ments to test the outcome of theoretical predictions. Physics works by constant and two-way interaction
between abstract and physical. Exactly how it does this has been the subject of philosophical inves-
tigation for centuries, and while progress has been made, there is no clear and definitive description
of the scientific process (see for example [23–26]). However, there are certain things that we can and
cannot say about the specific question of the relationship between abstract description and physical
entity. We use these to build a framework in which outstanding questions can be located, and which
enables us to use what is known about the process of physics to show the relationship between physics
and computing; and thereby to describe physical computation. It is important to note here that we
are not claiming to solve the problems of the philosophy of science. The framework we propose will
hopefully be of interest to people in this field, but it has been constructed with the aim not of solving
current issues but rather re-describing them.
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FIG. 1: Representation in physics. (a) Spaces of abstract and physical objects (here, an electron and a wave-
function). (b) The representation relation used as the modelling relation R mediating between the spaces.
III. PHYSICS AND THE REPRESENTATION RELATION
The key to the interaction between abstract and physical entities in physics is via the representation
relation (see for example [21, 27]). This is the method by which physical systems are given abstract
descriptions: an atom is represented as a wavefunction, a billiard ball as a point in phase space, a
black hole as a metric tensor, and so on. That this relation is possible is a pre-requisite for physics:
without a way of describing objects abstractly, we cannot do science. We have given examples of
mathematical representation, but this is not necessary: it can be any abstract description of an object,
logical, mathematical, or linguistic. Which type of representation has an impact on what sort of physics
is possible: if we have a linguistic representation of object weight that is simply “heavy” or “light”,
then we are able to do much less precise physics than if we use a numerical amount of newtons.
The most important property of the representation relation is that it is the relation that takes us
across the divide between abstract and physical. The representation relation is unique in this respect,
allowing a map between physical and abstract spaces: when we represent the physical and abstract
as in figure 1 (and subsequent figures), we are referring to the spaces themselves, not mathematical
descriptions of them, and the representation relation is not a mathematical relation. Precisely what
it is, how it exists (and indeed can possibly exist) is a matter of ongoing research for philosophers of
science; we know, nevertheless, that such a thing does exist. The representation relation is the relation
that allows us to deal with the physical world at an abstract level; without it, any abstract reasoning
about the physical world is not possible.
For a physicist, there is very little mystery in the representation relation: it is how physics works. This
relation is how we can write down |ψ〉 and think that we are talking about an electron or a hydrogen
atom or a Bose-Einstein condensate. Every time we use something abstract to represent something
physical, we use a representation relation. It is important to notice that the representation of any given
system is not unique: for example, a rubidium atom can be represented as a quantum bit (qubit), or
as the solution to a master equation, or as a multi-level system with many orbitals.
This initial use of the representation relation in physics is fundamentally the process of modelling: an
electron is modelled as a wavefunction, an aeroplane as a vector, and so on [21, part1]. The modelling
relation R takes an individual physical entity p to its abstract model mp. We use lower case for
individual entities and uppercase for mappings between entities. Physical objects are given by bold
letters, abstract by italic. We now have a picture as in figure 1(b). This is the most basic use of
representation, and we can immediately see that it is an asymmetric relation. Having an abstract
representation for certain physical systems does not, in general, tell us how to find a physical system
that matches a given abstract entity. When modelling, the physical system is known to exist (it is that
which is modelled). However, there is no a priori reason to suppose that there is a physical system
corresponding to every model. A theorist can write down, for example, the qubit state |ψ〉 = α |0〉+β |1〉;
for an experimentalist, however, to discover and build a system to which it corresponds is often no
trivial matter. While these two directions of representation are not absolutely disjoint, the exasperation
sometimes expressed by experimentalists towards the unrealistic demands of theorists has its roots in
the asymmetries of the representation relation between physical and abstract entities.
The two directions of the representation relation, modelling from physical to abstract, and instantia-
tion from abstract to physical, lie at the heart of our questions around when a physical system computes.
In physics we represent the physical world using abstract and mathematical/logical concepts. In phys-
ical computation we want to take an abstract entity, a computation, and represent it physically. Put
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FIG. 2: Parallel evolution of theory and experiment. (a) Physical system p is represented abstractly by mp
using the modelling representation relation RT of theory T . (b) Abstract dynamics CT (mp) give the evolved
abstract state m′p. (c) Physical dynamicsH(p) give the final physical state p
′. (d)RT is used again to represent
p′ as mp′ .
simply, abstract models may be created at will; physical objects cannot. Without a simple relation that
takes us from abstract to physical, how do we use the physical to instantiate the abstract?
In order to answer this, we first need to consider the interaction between theory and experiment in
physics. To do this, we give a framework in which the relationship between theoretical models and
experiments can be understood. This then forms the basis for a formal framework in which we define
physical computation.
IV. THEORY AND EXPERIMENT IN PHYSICS
The basic purpose of experiments in science is to test a modelling relation: is the model a good model?
At this stage of testing a theory, the only available representation relation is this modelling relation:
we have a theory that takes us from physical to abstract, but not vice-versa.
The models that are used in physics are not isolated, but rather located within specific, abstract,
physical theories: an electron has a representation as a wavefunction in standard quantum mechanics,
but as a point-mass in classical mechanics and as a vector in Fock space in quantum field theory. This is
an important point: the representation relation is theory-dependent. When we test physical theories, we
are testing, amongst other things, the representation that they give for physical objects. We therefore
write the modelling relation as RT , where T is the theory in which it is located.
The model of a specific physical system, what we might call the kinematical representation, is then
subject to the dynamics of the abstract theory. For example, the wavefunction ψ of an electron in a
Stern-Gerlach apparatus would be described as interacting under a given Hamiltonian dependent on
the magnetic field strength. This can be worked out purely mathematically. Note that we are using
the term ‘dynamics’ somewhat loosely; any theory of the physical system that produces output states
from input states is applicable, whether it be couched in terms of evolution over time, or least-action
principles etc..
We now have the situation at the abstract level given in figure 2(a): a physical system p is given an
abstract representation mp by the modelling representation relation RT . This is then evolved using
the dynamics of theory T , CT , resulting in the abstract system m
′
p
, as shown in figure 2(b). Now the
physical system p is not, in general, static: it undergoes its own evolution in the physical world, H.
The resultant physical system, after evolution, is p′, as shown in figure 2(c). We now have the question
about the relationship of p′ to m′
p
. m′
p
is the abstract description, probably mathematical, of how the
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FIG. 3: A ‘good enough’ commuting diagram for an experiment to test a theory. See text for details.
theory T thinks our physical system p should have evolved. How do we tell if T has got it right or
not? To do this, we need some way to compare p′ to m′
p
. With only a modelling relation we cannot
construct a physical system from m′
p
and compare it to p′; however, we can construct a mathematical
entity from p′, using RT , and compare it to m
′
p
.
This gives us the situation in figure 2(d): at the abstract level we now have the abstractly-evolved
system m′
p
and the abstract representation of the physically-evolved system mp′ . Two abstract objects
created by the same representation relation RT can now be directly compared.
What we expect of a ‘good’ physical theory is that it produces a commuting diagram from this figure.
In other words, that the theory T is such that we can either let a system undergo physical evolution, or
evolve it abstractly, and still reach the same place in the diagram corresponding to the ‘correct’ answer.
This not a full specification of what it means to be a good physical theory, but simply a minimal
requirement: that the prediction of the theory, m′
p
, is what we get in reality. An absolutely commuting
diagram therefore requires that m′
p
= mp′ , and it would seem at first sight that this is the requirement
given in experimental physics: if the mathematical representation of the experiment outcome is not
identical to the prediction, then the theory falls under suspicion. Compare, for example, the diagram
used by Ladyman et. al. to define their ‘L-machine’ [28], which uses nondirectional representation and
requires absolute commutation. However, this is a much more stringent requirement than is used in
practice. Experimental error and limitations of modelling mean that we are content if m′
p
and mp′ are
‘close enough’: |m′
p
−mp′ | < ǫ. Exactly how big or small ǫ can be to be ‘good enough’ depends very
much on the context of the experiment: an undergraduate finding the energy levels of a well-studied
SQuID for an assignment will probably impose a less strict closeness requirement than a team testing
whether they have found the Higgs boson. The outcome in terms of the diagram, however, is the same:
for the practical purposes to which it will be put, for the accuracy at which it has been tested, the theory
T is such that the diagram commutes. Abstract predictions may then be made of physical evolution,
which are the same as the abstract representations of the evolved physical systems.
It is worth emphasising again exactly what is involved in diagrams such as figure 2, and those for the
Layman L-machine. These are diagrams indicating representation of physical objects (below the line)
by abstract ones (above). Physical objects themselves are indicated below the line, not a mathematical
representation of them. This contrasts with another set of diagrams that look at first sight very similar:
those of Abstract Interpretation, where the concrete (operational) semantics for a computer is related
to the abstract semantics for its programming [29]. While structurally similar to the diagrams here,
Abstract Interpretation (as its name suggests) concerns entirely mathematical objects (the concrete and
abstract semantics). The relations between them are straightforwardly mathematical relations. The
representation relation, however, is not mathematical: therein lies the difference between the treatment
of computers in theoretical computer science and our present concern to deal with them explicitly as
objects in the physical world.
V. COMMUTING DIAGRAMS
We have spoken above somewhat loosely about a theory T producing a commuting diagram for
experiments. We now detail exactly what T consists in, and its relationship to the representation and
dynamics, RT and CT , used in our diagrams. First of all, though, we should note that we have not
taken up a stance on what is needed for an experiment to confirm or refute a theory: all we are claiming
is that any reasonable description of the scientific process must produce a de facto commuting diagram.
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Let us consider an experiment to test a physical theory Ttest, figure 3. The physical setup is denoted by
p as before, and comprises the entire experiment. To take a specific example, consider a rubidium atom
in a cavity that is being excited by laser light in order to test a theory of when its excited state will decay
for a certain wavelength of incoming photons. p comprises both the atom that is being investigated and
the apparatus (cavity, laser, detection devices etc): p = ptest + papparatus. The apparatus is described
by a theory Tapparatus. The abstract description of the experimental setup, mp, is produced using the
representation relation corresponding to the theory of the apparatus, RT (apparatus).
The experiment then proceeds: the laser is fired, the atom excited, and a decay event timed. The
entire physical system evolves to p′, as before. The evolution of the abstract system must now be worked
out to find the prediction against which the experimental outcome will be measured. The combination
of the theories of the apparatus and the theory being tested produces a set of dynamical equations (or
other abstract representation that takes initial to final states). This combined theory, T , we can write
as T = Ttest+Tapparatus. The complete set of dynamics it produces is CT . Applying these to the specific
system model mp to predict its evolution entails calculating the evolution CT (mp). The result is the
prediction m′
p
.
We now reach the final stage of the experiment. The entire experiment, apparatus plus atom, has
evolved to its outcome state. In order to compare with the prediction, an abstract description of this
final state is needed. This is produced by another use of the modelling relation for the apparatus,
RT (apparatus). This is the step that takes us from, for example, current surges in a detector to a
description that a photon was detected at a certain time. We rely on our theory of the experimental
apparatus to say that such an observed effect came from a photon, not any other kind of event. The
fact that we must make use of RT (apparatus) to represent the outcome of experiments is known in the
philosophy of science as the theory-ladenness of observation [30]. There are no ‘basic’ observations that
are unmediated by any kind of theory, all the way down to the level that when we see, hear, or touch
something we must form the theory that our senses are not deceiving us in order to correlate sense data
with external objects.
Let us assume that the experiment was a success, and mp′ is close enough (by whatever criteria
we are using) to m′
p
. The theory that then lives to fight another day is the combined theory T =
Ttest+Tapparatus under the particular circumstances of the experiment which used the dynamics CT (mp)
of the combined system p = ptest + papparatus. What has actually been tested in this experiment is
this very specific set of dynamics and representation: we have a commuting diagram for RT (apparatus)
and CT (mp) – not T itself. This is the reason why multiple experiments on many different systems
are considered necessary in order to argue for the correctness of a theory T (the process by which this
actually happens being one of the foundational problems of the philosophy of science that we are not
attempting to solve).
Moreover, T = Ttest + Tapparatus, and so if we want to use the experiment to test Ttest, we need to be
sure about Tapparatus. This means that Tapparatus must previously itself have been subject to testing by a
series of experiments, each of which formed their own commuting diagrams. These will be tests of both
the dynamics and the model of the apparatus. If the theory of the apparatus, in either dynamics or
modelling, is incorrect, then the experiment is flawed. An example of an incorrect theory of apparatus
was the 2011 announcement of faster-than-c neutrino speed by the OPERA experiment [31]. A cable
connected in an unexpected manner meant that the theory of the apparatus was incorrect, and hence
that the representation RT (apparatus) to find the arrival time measurement was flawed [32]. This gave
an incorrect abstract description mp′ to the experimental outcome (in that specific case, an incorrect
time stamp to a detection event). As a consequence, an incorrect argument was made that the failure
of T = Trelativity + Tapparatus was owing to a failure of Trelativity rather than, as turned out to be the
case, a failure of Tapparatus.
Experimental science then usually proceeds by using apparatus about whose theory we are reasonably
confident to test theories of specific systems about which we are not so confident. As the OPERA result
showed, this is in practice usually a messy affair, not a straightforward progression through progressively
more ‘true’ theories. An experimentalist whose apparatus does not spring nasty behavioural surprises
on them on a regular basis is fortunate indeed. We can therefore think of the whole process in terms of
multiple inter-connected diagrams, each of which is a specific experimental instance, for different theories
(for example, Tapparatus + Ttest apparatus to test the theory of the apparatus using another apparatus).
Whatever the method turns out to be by which scientific theories are chosen (confirmation, refutation,
explanatory power . . . ) the desired outcome is all these diagrams commuting. The scientific process
can therefore be thought of as solving, by whatever method, this many-diagram satisfiability problem.
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FIG. 4: Reversing the modelling relation within science: (a) A fully commuting diagram for physical and
abstract evolution, based on a modelling relation only. (b) The ‘predict cycle’: abstract theory is used to
predict physical evolution. (c) The ‘instantiation cycle’: using an instantiation representation relation R˜T , a
physical object is found corresponding to the predicted evolution.
The outcome of this process is then a set of theories that give rise to commuting diagrams in known
cases, which we have confidence (however gained) will also produce commuting diagrams given other
specific instances of a physical system p and its dynamics.
VI. REVERSING THE MODELLING RELATION: PREDICTION AND TECHNOLOGY
A theory producing a set of commuting diagrams is not the end of the scientific process. Once armed
with a ‘good’ physical theory, it is then put to use (with the proviso, again, that we make no claim about
the method by which theories are chosen as ‘good’). The theory itself can be seen as an explanation of
physical phenomena already known (the physical systems p that were modelled as mp and then used in
the original experiments). The next step is to use the theory as a predictive tool, inferring the existence
of phenomena, or even physical objects, about which we were previously ignorant.
There are two stages to prediction in science. The first is the use of the modelling relation to give an
abstract object that is then evolved. Based on a good theory, confidence that the complete diagram,
figure 4(a) would commute means that the physical evolution is not run: the abstract evolution alone
suffices to give the abstract representation of the physically-evolved system. This is the ‘predict cycle’,
figure 4(b): abstract evolution is used instead of physical to find the result mp′ ≈ m
′
p
.
If what is required out of a theory is an abstract prediction, then the cycle stops here. However, there
is a second stage. The abstract theory has now been used to describe an abstract object different from
the abstract descriptions of currently known physical objects. To what physical object does the abstract
one correspond? Stated in terms of the modelling relation, this question becomes: what physical system,
when modelled using our theory, will render this abstract object? In other words, we want to be able to
reverse the modelling relation, to find a physical object corresponding to our new abstract description.
Reversing the modelling relation then requires us to have at our disposal an entire set of commuting
diagrams, so that we can find the correct one to get a representation that in effect ‘runs in reverse’ from
abstract to physical. This is a highly skilled and creative task for both theorists and experimentalists.
There are many levels of interlocking diagrams that are involved in developing and testing a theory,
and that are then produced when a theory is used to predict outside the range of physical events used
to test it. While a reasonable level of confidence in a tested theory is needed in order to predict,
prediction-and-instantiation diagrams, figure 4(c), also become part of the many-diagram satisfiability
problem that is the scientific process, as noted above.
Instances of prediction and subsequent discovery using scientific theories are, of course, numerous.
One famous example is Dirac’s prediction of positrons [33]. By starting with a theory that had been
experimentally tested using many physical systems, and using knowledge of the way in which the theory
would model situations other that those that had been tested, the prediction was made that a particular
abstract object in the theory (a hole in a sea of negative energy electrons) would correspond to a physical
object (a positron). This prediction allowed a standard experimental cycle to be set up, and the diagram
was found to commute.
The construction and testing of a scientific theory that is robust enough to have predictive as well
as explanatory power is the end-point of the scientific process. However, the well-tested commuting
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FIG. 5: Technology reversing the modelling relation: p, T and H are found such that these conditions hold.
The combination of these conditions is a commuting diagram.
diagrams can then be put to use in order not just to discover new physical systems, but to construct
them. This is the realm of technology: using our theories to precision-engineer physical systems to
desired specifications. This is the final element needed in order for us to use this set of commuting
diagrams as a framework in which to describe computation.
Engineering and technology are reversals of the modelling relation in a very specific manner. They
start from the point of having a well-developed physical theory T , which we have sufficient confidence
in to expect that it will produce diagrams that commute outside the situations in which it was tested.
Within the representation of this theory, there is an abstract specification of the physical system that
we wish to construct, which we will (leadingly) call mp′ . The aim of technology is to construct the
corresponding physical system, p′, effectively reversing the modelling relation.
The process of technology to produce this reversal consists in finding a physical system p, the theory
T , and a specific set of evolutions H that will perform the evolution p −→ p′ such that, when p′ is
represented using RT , it becomes the desired mp′ . The physical system p is thus engineered using the
process H to produce the desired physical system p′. An example would be taking a set of steel girders
and building a bridge out of them.
A key consideration is how p, T , andH are to be found. With a reliable theory, they can be discovered
using abstract tools: in our bridge example, rather than physical trial-and-error of different materials
and construction techniques, a given starting point p can be modelled abstractly as mp, then evolved to
a final abstract state m′
p
. If this is close enough to the desired mp′ then the corresponding p and H are
good candidates for building the system. This is not a mechanical or algorithmic process: the correct
p, T , and H can be checked (at the very least the bridge can be built and we can see if it falls down),
but there is no straightforward process to select ones for testing in the first place. This is an important
fact about reversing the modelling relation: it requires ingenuity and skill on the part of the scientists
and engineers involved. We can talk about a ‘reversed modelling relation’, or an ‘instantiation relation’,
but only with the understanding that this is a shorthand for a whole sequence of preconditions. We
write as a shorthand R˜T , understanding that R˜T ≡ f(RT , T ) relies both on the theory T that has
been developed, and on the primitive modelling relation RT . The equivalence is given in figure 5: the
physical system p evolves under H to p′ which is represented in T as the desiredmp′ ; T is such that the
representation of p evolves abstractly to m′
p
; and m′
p
≡ mp′ . The conjunction of these three conditions
is that the full diagram commutes. We can, then, reverse the modelling relation with technology, but
only when the theory T is sufficiently advanced confidently to give commuting diagrams in all the cases
we wish to consider.
VII. WHEN DOES A PHYSICAL SYSTEM COMPUTE?
We are now in a position to demonstrate how computation fits into this framework of physical theory,
experiment, prediction, and technology. We argue that a ‘computer’ is a physical system about which
we have a set of physical theories from which we derive both the full representation relation {RT , R˜T }
and the dynamics CT . We are sufficiently confident in our theory T that we can assume that it gives
rise to commuting diagrams even when the exact starting states, p and mp, and the precise evolutions,
CT (mp) and H(p), are different from the states and evolutions used in testing. Only when our physical
theory of the computational device is sufficiently advanced that we can argue that all diagrams commute
(in the scenarios we will use it for) can the physical system be used as a computer. In this situation, as
when the theory is used for prediction, we must have a sufficiently advanced and good theory that the
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FIG. 6: (a) Embedding an abstract problem M(S) into an abstract machine description mp using embedding
∆, then encoding into p. (b) Addition of two binary numbers using a computer (see text for details). (c) The
‘compute cycle’: using a reversed representation relation to encode data, physical evolution of the computer is
used to predict abstract evolution. Compare with figure 4(c).
representation relation can run in either direction.
The first distinction between computing and experimental science in this framework is the initial
state. Previously, the physical state p has been the starting point; however, in a computation the
initial impetus is not a physical system that needs to be described, but rather an abstract object that
we wish to evolve. An abstract problem is the reason why a physical computer is used.
We therefore start immediately with the problem of a reversed representation relation. The abstract
initial state mp must be instantiated in a physical system p: right from the beginning, we see that a
computer is fundamentally an item of technology. Even to begin the process of computation, we require
a well-understood and well-tested system. The reversal of the representation relation at the start of a
computation is the process of encoding abstract data in the physical system. It relies fundamentally on
knowing exactly how the physical system works; on having a good enough physical theory to predict how
data encodings will work. The encoding representation, R˜T , is not only dictated by the physics of the
computer, but also by our choice of how to represent abstract computational objects such as numbers
in physical systems. For example, system designers in a standard semi-conductor-based computer chose
the modelling representation ‘voltage high → 1, voltage low → 0’. A crucial part of this choice is to
make a modelling relation RT that is easy to ‘reverse’ to get the R˜T needed for encoding at the initial
stage of computation. Another example of an RT that is easy to ‘effectively reverse’ is the dial input
on a Babbage engine [34]. An initial p that is the dial set to a certain angle is then represented as ‘0’,
another angle as ‘1’, another as ‘2’, and so on. With appropriate markings on the dial, it is easy for
the user to set up an initial physical situation that is represented as the desired number. In contrast,
an example of a representation that is extremely difficult to ‘effectively reverse’ is given by the old-
fashioned computers that used punch-cards. A pattern of holes on a card determined the input (and
indeed the program). Knowing exactly which holes to punch where (i.e. the exact physical state p to
produce) such that it had the desired abstract representation (such as ‘01’) was considered extremely
tedious and error-prone, requiring a great deal of skill and experience. In more recent times, anyone who
has struggled to push the right buttons on their smartphone to do the simplest task has experienced a
representation relation that was difficult to reverse, giving a difficult-to-use encoding relation. Making
RT sufficiently easy and intuitive to in-effect reverse is a core component of designing and building a
physical computing device.
There is one final element to a full computation. This is the process by which an abstract problem
(which may not even be posed mathematically) is put into a form such that it can be manipulated by a
computer. This is the (abstract) process of embedding the abstract problem in the abstract description
of the physical system, figure 6(a). To take a simple example, imagine you are very bad at mental
arithmetic, and are splitting a £50 restaurant bill equally between six friends using a calculator app.
You embed this problem in the decimal division problem “50/6”, and then encode this into the phone
by pressing the correct buttons. The embedded problem, ms, is the reason why we are interested in
instantiating the specific set-up of the computational device that is abstractly represented as mp. For
now, we will take the embedding as read and deal just with mp; embedding will be discussed in more
detail below, §VIIIA.
With embedding and encoding relations in place, let us consider as a simple example a digital com-
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puter running an algorithm that adds two two-bit numbers, for example 01 + 10 = 11. We first state
how each of the individual pieces fit into the diagram of figure 2(d), and then show how computation
proceeds.
The elements of the example are given in figure 6(b). The abstract initial state, mp = {01, 10} is
encoded, through the reversed representation relation (the encoding relation), in the physical system
p. This is the step of initialisation: p is the initial state of the computer hardware (voltage across
semiconductors, etc.). The representation relation has been derived from the theory we have about the
physical components of device, of current and how it changes under voltage changes. Detecting a high
voltage corresponds to representing a ‘1’, and low voltage is ‘0’. The initial physical setup therefore
instantiates an initial abstract state. In our example, two parts of the hardware are designated by RT
as ‘registers’, and the voltages in the components of those areas correspond to the representation of the
initial state as ‘01’ and ‘10’ (the two numbers we wish to add).
At the abstract level, the initial state is used as the input to an algorithm: in this example, it is
a sequence of gate operations CT that takes the input ‘01,10’ and adds them. An important part of
computation as actually used is that the result of the abstract evolution (here described in terms of gate
operations) is not necessarily known prior to the computation. The final abstract state, m′
p
= (11), is
not, in fact, evolved abstractly. Instead, at the physical level, a physical evolution H(p) is applied to
the state, producing the final physical state p′. In our example, this will be the hardware manipulation
of voltages. Finally, an application of RT takes the final physical state and represents it abstractly as
some mp′ .
This final use of the representation relation is the decoding step: the physical state of the system
is decoded as an abstract state. This is frequently simply the encoding step reversed, as in the above
examples; however, it need not be. For example, NMR (classical) computing uses a heterogenous
representation. For a particular gate, the input bits are encoded as phases and time delays in the radio
frequency pulses used to operate the gate, with different choices for each input “wire”; the output bit
is decoded from the value of the observed integrated spectral intensity [35]. Note also, that different
decodings can give rise to different computations being performed overall, even when everything else in
the system stays the same [36].
After the final decoding step, if the computer has the correct answer then m′
p
= (11). If we have
confidence in the theory of the computer, then we are confident that mp′ = m
′
p
, and that this would
be the outcome of the abstract evolution.
We can now see what it means to be performing a computation rather than an experiment. As we
have seen, in experimental physics a physical system is set up to parallel the abstract situation in order
to test the abstract. The upper half of the diagram has been worked out in detail, and we run the lower
half to compare with it. Once we have a commuting diagram, however, we no longer need to ‘run’ both
halves: as long as the diagram commutes, and as long as our theory allows us to run the representation
relation in both directions, we can get from initial state to final state by either abstract working or
by physical evolution. Prediction and instantiation took us by an upper route from physical system to
physical system via abstract prediction. Computation takes the lower route, starting in the abstract
and ending in the abstract, via the physical computer. This is physical computing: the use of a physical
system to predict the outcome of an abstract evolution. The ‘compute cycle’, figure 6(c), is an inverse
of prediction and instantiation, in contrast to the latter’s use of abstract theory to predict the outcome
of physical events.
We can now give the following as a set of necessary requirements for a physical system to be capable
of being used as a computer.
• A theory T of the physical computational device that has been tested in relevant situations and
about which we are confident.
• A representation {RT , R˜T } of the physical system that is used for representing the initial state of
the physical system (encoding using R˜T ) and also for the final state, so that output is produced
from the computation (decoding using RT ).
• At least one fundamental physical computational operation that takes input states to output
states.
• The theory, representation, and fundamental operation(s) satisfy the relevant sequence of com-
muting diagrams.
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All of these elements must be present in order for a physical system to be identified as acting as a
computer.
VIII. PHYSICAL DYNAMICS AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Up to now we have considered the dynamics of the computer and the abstract computation as a
single, indivisible evolution. We now look more closely at the structure of this evolution, as in general
(and particularly in the case of universal computing) it is made up of smaller units. In a standard,
digital, computer these are logic gates; other types of computation use units such as relaxation to a
ground state (quantum annealing), or other dynamical operations (as in the case of the differential
analyser). In the standard, gate-based, case the input is separate from the program, but in other cases
the initialisation of the system can contain both the program and the input. In that case, all the work
is done by the representation RT , and the theoretical dynamics C and physical evolution H do not
change for different algorithms. The fundamental issues remain the same in both cases and, for the
sake of concreteness, we use the example here of a gate-based programmable computer. In this case,
the first use of RT determines initialisation and the input; C is then the abstract program to be run,
and H the physical dynamics that will implement it.
We have referred to C here as both ‘algorithm’ and ‘program’, and we now need to make precise
what we mean by this. An algorithm is a very high-level concept, detailing what is to be performed
on an input, such as addition. However, in order to actually implement an algorithm, it needs to be
broken down into components, and each of these components represented by fundamental operations –
standardly, these are basic gate operations. This is the process of refinement and compilation. Once
the basic operations have been determined for the algorithm, if there is a sequence of operations (as in
standard gate-based computers) then they are composed to be run on the physical computer.
In the previous section we discussed the embedding of an abstract problem into the physical computer.
It is that process that we are now expanding. The embedding relation can be viewed as a composition
of many different abstract embeddings, starting with embedding a problem into an algorithm, and then
the refinement and composition of the algorithm into machine descriptions that can then be encoded
in the physical computer.
A. Refinement
Refinement (or reification) is the computational process of taking an abstract algorithm, and produc-
ing a suitably equivalent concrete algorithm that is implementable on a computer [37]. The requirements
for correct refinement (that the concrete design faithfully implements the abstract specification) also
involves commuting diagrams; in this case, however, the diagrams live entirely in the abstract realm.
As an example, consider the algorithm for decimal addition. Figure 7(a) shows the process of refine-
ment from the abstract concept of mathematical base ten addition, through a more concrete concept
of an algorithm for binary addition, to the most concrete (for this example) level of an assembly lan-
guage program implementation of binary addition. Each level is in the mathematical realm, and can
be proved correct with respect to the higher level. Some steps (usually the higher level ones) may
require human design ingenuity; lower level steps can be performed automatically (computed) by an
interpreter, compiler or assembler. Refinement of conventional computational algorithms stops in the
mathematical realm, and assumes that the underlying physical device correctly implements the lowest
level. The figure shows the standard levels of refinement, positioned on top of our diagram for the
underlying device: a physical assembly language computer. The relevant theory is that of the binary
arithmetic. Accompanying theories that need to be developed are those of any relevant compilers and
interpreters. Some of these accompanying theories can be purely mathematical (as they “implement”
formal refinement steps), but some of them have to cross the mathematical-physical divide.
For unconventional computational devices, where the lowest square commutes only “up to ǫ”, the
traditional refinement approach of sequencing many computations would have to take error propagation
into account.
The dividing line between the physical and mathematical realms is a design choice: more sophisticated
physical devices can be engineered to perform appropriate refinement computations. Figure 7(b) shows
the same abstract calculation, here refined only to the level of binary addition, and being implemented
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FIG. 7: Physical computation, with layers of refinement R on top for base ten (decimal) addition (“dec add”),
binary addition (“binary add”), and assembly language addition (“asm add”). Note the physical device and
representation differ in each case.
on a physical binary adder. Now the relevant theory is that of the binary addition computer. This
might be a combination of the theories of the assembly language computer and the relevant assembler.
Figure 7(c) shows the same abstract calculation, now with no refinement level, being implemented on
a physical arithmetic computer. Now the relevant theory is that of the physical arithmetic computer.
This might be a combination of the theories of the assembly language computer, the relevant software
assembler, and an interpreter or compiler.
These diagrams all assume that the refinement described is possible. This need not be the case: there
may be no possible embedding available, at one or more levels. This is the situation in which it is not
possible to perform the desired computation on the given hardware. For example, there is no embedding
that will allow an arbitrary billion digit integer to be represented in a machine with only a million bytes
of memory: the machine simpy isn’t large enough. The availability or otherwise of embedding steps
tells us about the physical capabilities of our necessarily finite computers, as opposed to the arbitrarily
large computations that can be described abstractly.
B. Composition
The output of a refined and compiled process is a sequence of fundamental abstract operations that
compose to produce the desired abstract process (the algorithm). Where a computation is composed
of more than one fundamental operation, there are two parts to this: the fundamental operations
themselves, and the rules by which they compose. For example, the set of operations could be AND, OR,
and NOT, and the composition rules will tell you, for example, what happens when an OR is followed by
a NOT. We now look first at what it means to implement one of the fundamental operations in a physical
system, and then at their composition where these are now all being run as physical computations.
A gate is an abstract evolution Ci. When applied to a particular (abstract) input x it produces the
(abstract) output y = Ci(x). It is then the top line of a diagram of its own. To implement this gate
physically is to produce a physical system, a representation relation, and a dynamics of the physical
system such that the resultant diagram commutes. To do this, the hardware designer uses exactly the
same process of theory and experiment that we detailed above as experimental physics: the system is
tested with multiple inputs, the representation and the dynamics scrutinised, and finally a theory Ti of
the gate produced. This theory tells us that when data are represented in such a way in the physical
system then the dynamics produces such an output after the final representation. Confidence in this
‘gate theory’ means confidence that whenever the input is given in a specified way, the physical dynamics
Hi that have been chosen by this process of experimentation give rise to a commuting diagram.
Each individual gate Ci is therefore tested, and the physical theory (which gives the encoding and
decoding) Ti developed of the gate produces its own commuting diagram with a given physical system
pi, representationRTi and physical dynamicsHi. We also require, as well as individual theories of gates,
a theory TC that describes how they compose (making sure that they do not, for example, contradict
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each other). As with all physical theories, this compositional theory will be produced by the interaction
of theory and experiment, and give rise to its own commuting diagrams with the physical system that
is being used as a computer.
The theory of the physical computer is therefore developed in order to predict the outcome in situa-
tions that are unknown – exactly as we use theories in physics. This theory is then extended and tested
further, in exactly the same way that any physical theory is developed. The end result of this testing and
development is a computer, and the theory that governs it, T = {TC , Ti}. What confidence in T gives
is confidence that, within the limits of T , any diagram that can be written (that is, any input and any
program), will commute. The physical system, the computer, can then with confidence be used to find
the result of abstract evolutions written as compositions of the fundamental gates. When any (Turing)
computable abstract evolution can be so written, the computer is (Turing) universal (see for example
[14, ch3]). A universal computer has the property that the hard work of experimentally producing
commuting diagrams need only be done once, then the computer can be used for any computation.
IX. COMPUTATIONAL ENTITIES
We now have a set of elements and a framework necessary for identifying when a physical system
is performing a computation. Two important parts of this framework are the initial and final steps of
encoding and decoding. At the beginning of the computation, the representation relation is used to
encode abstract data and programs in the physical system, and then at the end it is used to decode the
state of the physical system into an abstract output. Without the encode and decode steps, there is
no computation; there is simply a physical system undergoing evolution. This, then, is one of the key
ways in which this frameworks distinguishes between a physical system ‘going about its business’, and
the same physical system undergoing the same physical evolution, but this time being used to compute.
This is how we can escape from falling into the trap of ‘everything is information’ or ‘the universe is
a computer’: a system may potentially be a computer, but without an encode and a decode step it is
just a physical system.
The question of whether a given physical system is acting as a computer then becomes a question of
representation at two different levels. Can we represent what is going on, physically and abstractly, as
including an encode and decode step, i.e. as including representation? A necessary condition of there
being representation present is that there is, as well as the computer, an entity capable of establishing
a representation relation. That is, an entity that represents this specific physical system as this specific
abstract object, encoding and decoding data into it. Something must always be present that is capable
of encoding and decoding: if there is a computer, what is using it?
The necessary existence of a computational entity is a fundamental and integral part of the framework
presented here. Without this requirement, there is no differentiation between computation and ordinary
physical evolution. It also, at first sight, goes completely against the grain of objective science. Perhaps
the most important conceptual breakthrough of information science at its inception was the separation
of information as a quantity from its meaning [38]. The former could be discussed independent of
any person or thing performing the computation, whereas the latter was irredeemably subjective. If
we are now saying that computational processes cannot be described independently of computation
entities (human or otherwise), an immediate concern is that the act of computation then becomes
wholly subjective, possibly subject to the intent of the entity running the computer, and not something
that can be dealt with by an objective scientific theory of computation. This is an important concern,
which we now address.
The first thing to note is that all the requirements we have given, including the requirement that a
computational entity responsible for representation be present, are objective requirements. It is simply
an objective fact of the matter whether or not a computational entity is part of the system. Consider,
for example, that you are watching a student work out a problem using a calculator. There is nothing
subjective about the existence of the student. Furthermore, the requirements on the computational
entity are not subjective (there is no requirement, for example, for an intent to compute or any subjective
position to be taken up towards the computational device): the requirement is that an encoding and
a decoding are present, an objective fact of the matter. By close observation of the student, you
can determine if information is being encoded into and decoded from the calculator. You as the
observer can formulate and test the hypothesis that the student and calculator form a computing
system. If you and another observer differ in your theories, there is a fact of the matter as to which
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of you is correct (although, as with any scientific theory, you may not have all the data required
to settle the question). Fundamentally, the question of computational entities comes down to the
question of the objective existence or otherwise of encoding and decoding. The entities are required only
because encoding/decoding cannot be defined otherwise, not because encoding/decoding is subjective
or perspectival.
Computational entities are a requirement for physical computing as opposed to abstract computation.
The occurrance of representation is a vital part of physical computing, and computational entities
are the ones performing it. This is the central reason that they are required within a computing
system: computational entities are the physical entities that locate the representation relation. Without
representation, encoding and decoding do not happen. Computation considered as a purely abstract
process, as in theoretical computer science, does not require a computational entity; however when the
abstract is instantiated in a physical computing device, the computational entity responsible for the
representation relation between abstract and physical must be physically realised.
There is a very close and important relationship here with another branch of computational theory:
communication theory, and how it uses the parties in a transmission to describe the transmission of
information. Usually termed Alice and Bob, the communicating entities are responsible for encoding
information into a signal at one end, and decoding it at the other. While a theoretical treatment of a
communication scenario need deal only with the transmitted signals, actually sending a message requires
Alice and Bob. We can, in fact, locate communication entirely within our framework for computing: the
encode and decode steps remain (usually performed by distinct spatiotemporally separated entities),
and the evolution of the physical system is an identity computation (the message remains the same
between sender and receiver). The definitions of computational and communicating entities coincide.
As with a communicating entity, there is nothing in the definition of a computational entity that
requires it to be human. There is also no need to bring in ill-defined descriptions such as ‘conscious’ or
not. Communication theorists refer as a matter of course to computer terminals, or circuits, or photo-
detectors as the communicating entities. Simply, anything that is capable of encoding and decoding
information is a computational entity. Whether or not any given entity is capable of this is an objective
fact of the matter about which hypotheses can be formulated, tested, and argued over. Part of the
objective description of the computational entity is the sophistication of the encoding and decoding
operation that it is capable of supporting. If the computational entity is a human being, we are fairly
certain about what representations it is capable of. If, for example, a person were writing a computer
program to solve a second-order differential equation then we would happily describe the encoding and
decoding operation as just that. If, on the other hand, a cat walked across the keyboard and randomly
touched exactly the right keys to type out that same program, it would not be a good hypothesis that
it was calculating a differential equation. To argue that it was would require the cat to be capable of a
complexity of encoding and decoding (including a knowledge of differential equations) that we usually
describe as outwith a cat’s intellectual capacity. This is not something that is subjective or a matter of
opinion: it is a matter of fact about which hypotheses can be formed and tested.
As can be seen from this example, it is also sometimes the case that a degree of argument is needed
to settle if something is or is not a computation. Again, this is a situation familiar from communication
theory. Take for example the gradual acceptance in the 1960s of the information transmission nature of
a bee’s “waggle dance” [39]. This had not previously been recognised as an instance of communication,
and it was only after much debate that a description of the situation as containing an encoding and
decoding of information was accepted. This is, however, a matter of fact not of opinion: that argument
was required to settle the matter does not make it subjective.
The relationship with communication also illuminates another situation which might otherwise be
considered problematic. Entities are required to encode and decode data in the computation; what hap-
pens if, say, the computational entity is removed before the decode step? Is computing still happening?
The confusion can arise because the physical computer is undergoing the same evolution as during a
computation but, in the absense of a decode operation, it is not computing. An example of an exactly
equivalent situation with communication helps us see why not. Consider the case of Egyptian hiero-
glyphics: after the loss of the language, and before the Rosetta stone was deciphered, did a hieroglyphic
inscription perform a communication? It was potentially a communication, just as a physical system
can potentially be a computer. However, until a decode was possible, it did not in actuality perform
communication (no-one could read it). Once the language was understood, the decoding relation was
in place, and communication could occur.
Encoding and decoding information in physical objects is something that does not, in itself, restrict
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FIG. 8: (a) Two separate physical systems, p and s. (b) Commuting diagram when testing the ability of s to
simulate p.
computational entities even to being biological. It is perfectly coherent for a computer itself to encode
and decode information in another object. For example, we could replace the student in the above
situation with a pre-programmed artificial intelligence (AI). While it would probably not be the most
efficient use of its processing power, it could certainly use the calculator to find the answer to problems
that it did not work out internally. Again, it would be an objective fact of the matter whether it was
setting up an encoding and decoding between itself and the computational device, and hence if the
physical system (the calculator in this case) were computing.
One final point should be made about computational entities. It is important to be clear exactly
what in a computational system is performing the encoding and decoding for the computation. For
example, just because a human being is involved in the system does not mean that they are the com-
putational entity. A good example of this is where a human is performing a computational evolution
without having access to the encode or decode steps. This was, in fact, the case in the original ‘com-
puters’, which were groups of people performing small repetitive tasks which, when taken as a whole,
comprised a computation [40]. The ‘computers’ were not there the computational entities. A more
recent example is the many ‘crowd-sourcing’ games, such as those for circuit optimisation in quantum
computers [41] or gene sequencing in ash trees [42]. In both cases, human players can become part
of the computational evolution without knowledge of the encoding or decoding (in the philosophical
literature, this is the position of the inhabitant of Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ [43]). As a consequence,
they are not computational entities. Instead, the computational entities are the human scientists using
the games to compute problems that they have encoded in the games. It would not be impossible, in
fact, for an AI-programmed computer to make use of such a game, in which case the AI would be the
computational entity, and the human players part of the computer.
X. COMPUTATION AND SIMULATION
We now turn to a specific type of computation, the simulation of the physical dynamics of a system.
While physical computation is a straightforward replacement of physical evolution for abstract com-
putation, it can cause confusion when a physical system is the subject of a computation, as well as a
physical system being used to perform a computation.
We will consider the situation where a physical system (the computer), s, is to be used to simulate
the behaviour of another physical system, p. We show this as in figure 8(a). The aim is to build a
commuting diagram similar to those given above for standard computation, where the dynamics of s is
used instead of the dynamics of p.
We are, in fact, in an exactly analogous situation to the introduction of the representation relation:
what we want is for system s to represent system p. There is no way of comparing two physical objects
without forming a representation of them – even basic, apparently representation-free, comparisons such
as ‘hold side by side and see if they’re the same dimensions’ in fact require us to represent parts of the
external world by identifying individual objects and a set of properties that are its dimensions (this is
a foundational issue in science and metaphysics – see for example [21, ch1,2]). Abstract representations
of the physical systems are created and then used in order to compare the two systems.
Just as when we looked at diagrams for computers, we start first with the diagram for setting up a
simulator and testing that it indeed does what we want. This is given in figure 8(b). The steps in the
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FIG. 9: System s running as a simulator for system p, constructed as a compute cycle nested within a predict
cycle: (a) the predict cycle using C(p) to find the abstract prediction for the evolution of system p; (b)
embedding C(p) in the simulator model dynamics, C(s); (c) adding the compute cycle: the physical simulator
s now determines the abstract evolution C(s).
diagram marked ‘E’ and ‘D’ are embedding steps: we wish to embed the abstract description of system
p in the abstract description of system s. For example, if s is a scale model of p then this embedding
is the relevant scale factor. We saw the process of embedding first with straightforward computation,
where an abstract problem is embedded in the abstract description of the physical computer. Here, the
abstract problem is itself the abstract description of a second physical process: that is the problem that
the computer is being used to solve. As with the refinement process, performing the embedding may
itself require computation, in this example, multiplying by the scale factor. In this way, the abstract
object ns is used to represent the abstract object mp, analogous to an abstract object being used to
represent a physical one.
For system s to be a good simulator of system p, all relevant diagrams of the form of figure 8(b) must
commute, closing the gap at the end between mp′ and m
′
p
. This is discovered in the same way that
commuting diagrams for standard computation are found: a sufficiently good theory of the devices is
needed, such that we are confident that all diagrams will commute and that the representation can be
run in either direction. With this in place we can then change from testing the simulator to using it.
Full use of system s to simulate system p is shown in figure 9(c). The aim is to reach the abstract
outcome m′
p
≈ mp′ without going through the physical evolution p → p
′. Instead, three levels of
representation are used to achieve the result using the physical system s:
1. The physical system to be simulated, p, is represented abstractly, mp.
2. mp is embedded into an abstract initial state of the physical system s, ns.
3. The abstract description ns is instantiated as a physical initial state of the simulator, s.
At the end, the state of s′ is decoded to find the output of the simulator, ns′ . This is then de-embedded
to represent an output state of system p, m′
p
. Overall, the abstract description of the simulator is used
to represent the abstract description of the system to be simulated, and then the physical simulator
device is used to represent its own abstract description.
Figure 9 shows a point that is key to understanding simulation: what is simulated is the model of the
physical system mp, not p itself. The simulator and the physical system under simulation interact only
at the abstract level.
There are several, qualitatively different, ways in which simulation is used, which we can show within
this framework. Consider the decomposition of a simulation shown in figure 9. Simulation is viewed
as form of prediction, by comparison with figure 4(b): the aim is to find the outcome of the physical
evolution of p without actually evolving p to p′. However, rather than the prediction being performed
purely abstractly, the abstract evolution is worked out using a computation. Simulation of one system by
another is therefore a compute cycle nested within a predict cycle. Importantly, the physical evolution
p′ is taken to match up abstractly with the computational evolution, m′
p
≈ mp′ . This is the case
when the simulation is accepted as a good guide to the physical evolution; examples include when novel
hardware is simulated for the purposes of testing and programming before it is built.
An alternative way of viewing this figure is to consider the dynamics of the simulator, C(s), and
the dynamics being simulated, C(p). The compute cycle is on this view the fundamental part, the
computer being used to determine the dynamics C(p); this is the computation that is being run. It just
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FIG. 10: A system simulating itself (compare with figure 8(c)).
so happens that C(p) is an abstract representation of another physical system. These dynamics are
then embedded into the abstract dynamics of the simulator, C(s) – for example, into an algorithm. This
is then run as a compute cycle, with the relevant encoding and decoding into the physical computer.
If the final diagram is known to commute, then this is an equivalent description to those given above.
However, there is also a case where this form of simulation is used but we do not know whether in
the end m′
p
≈ mp′ . This is the case of computational physics, where computers are used to simulate
behaviour in a physical system during an experiment. Comparing with figure 3, in this situation the
abstract dynamics CT (mp) are embedded in the simulator and the outcome of this theoretical model
is computed using a physical computer. The decoded and de-embedded result of simulating the model
is then compared with the abstract description of the experimental outcome. This whole situation is
then a compute cycle nested within an experiment cycle.
This framework for simulation is not restricted to the case where the simulating system s is a standard
computer, such as a supercomputer being used to simulate molecular properties of materials. There are
other ways in which simulation of a system can be run, where something that is not usually considered
to be ‘a computer’ can simulate another physical system. Aircraft designers use wind tunnels and
models to simulate the effect of flying on aeroplane parts. A pendulum can be used to simulate a spring
and discover oscillation periods. Single-purpose physical simulators have a long history prior to the
widespread use of programmable computers, and all of these fit within the framework we have given.
When considering these ‘non-standard’ simulators, one situation that must be addressed is when a
simulator is simulating itself. It is often given out as a truism that “everything simulates itself”. It
should be clear by now that this is not the case within our framework: just as not every physical
evolution is a computation, not every physical event is a simulation. Just as with computation, in
the absence of embedding, and of encoding and decoding operations, simulation is not occurring. It is
important to note that, in the case of simulation, there are three embedding/encoding operations that
must be identified. Firstly, the system being simulated must have an abstract representation. Secondly,
that abstract representation must be embedded in the abstract representation of the simulator. The final
encoding and decoding, into and out of the physical simulator device, is the same as for computation.
Without all these steps being present, there is no simulation.
We can now consider the case of a system being used to simulate itself. For example, a pendulum can
simulate the same pendulum in a different gravitational field, or a laptop can simulate itself through
a virtual environment. In these cases, the places marked ‘E’ and ‘D’ in figure 9(a) do the work: the
embedding is scaling, or virtual software, and so on, even when s and p become the same physical
system. Note also, that the representations used for s and p need not be identical, even when the
physical systems are.
Finally, we can push this all the way and consider a situation where not only are the physical systems
identical, but so are the representations, and also the embeddings at ‘E’ and ‘D’ are the identity.
Do we then have a description by which any physical system is self-simulating? If we look at the
resulting diagram, figure 10, the answer is clearly ‘no’. We have either a compute cycle, if the abstract
theory is well enough known, or part of an experiment. In either case, we still have initial and final
representations. In the absence of these representational stages, a system does not simulate itself.
XI. NON-STANDARD COMPUTING: COMPUTATION OR EXPERIMENT?
We now turn to our main motivation for developing this framework for computing: the analysis of
physical devices to see if they are being used as computers. As noted previously, the use of a physical
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system as a computer is first and foremost a use of technology: computers are highly engineered devices.
We have considered science both in its process of experimentally testing theories, and its ability to
predict based on commuting abstract/physical representation diagrams. Engineering is different in the
following way. Consider figure 2(d), in the case of an unacceptably large ǫ. In science, we have some
given p, and are attempting find a good abstract characterisation C. If ǫ is too large, we need to
change C: we need to find a better characterisation. In engineering, we have a given C that we wish
to physically instantiate, and the goal is to find p, given C. If ǫ is too large, we need to change p: we
need to re-engineer our candidate system.
The essential difference then is the degree of confidence we have in our physical theory of the device:
if ǫ is too big in an experiment then the theory may be disproven; by contrast, in engineering it is
the system that is taken to be at fault. Of course, there are frequent cases where this is not a clear-
cut distinction. An example is in the earthquake proofing of buildings, where the technology is built
according to theory, but cannot be tested at scale. Data collected from each actual earthquake are then
used to refine the theory, which is then used in the next generation of technological construction. In
general, though, technology stands or falls on the confidence in the underlying theory. Amongst other
things, this confidence is that the theory works outside the situations in which it has been tested (note
that any subsequent use of a theory after it has been tested is a use outside the testing situation: at
the very least it differs in time).
The use of the theory outside the domain in which it has been tested is fundamental to computing: this
is prediction. As we saw in §VII, physical computing is in a sense the inversion of mathematical science,
using a physical system to predict the outcome of an abstract dynamics (rather than an abstract model
predicting physical dynamics). Without this predictive element, a physical system is not a computer,
in the same way that a set of mathematical equations is a bad physical model if it has no predictive
power.
A common, and unfortunate, method of ascribing computational ability to a non-standard system
is as follows. A novel computing substrate is proposed (a stone, a soap bubble, a large interacting
condensed-matter system, etc., etc.). The physical substrate is ‘set going’ and an evolution occurs. At
a certain point the end of the process is declared and measurements taken. The initial and final states
of the system are compared, and then a computation and a representation picked such that if the initial
state and final states are represented in such a way then such a computation would abstractly connect
them. The system is then declared to have performed such a computation: the stone has evalutated
the gravitational constant, the soap bubble has solved a complex optimization problem, and so on.
Such arguments, without any further testing or evidence, are rightly treated with suspicion. Given
the vast range of representation for physical systems available, almost any computation can be made to
fit the difference of initial and final physical states of a system. If such arguments really were correct,
we would not only have to conclude that everything in the universe computes, but that everything
computes every possible computation all of the time. Such extreme pancomputationalism is even less
useful than the usual kind.
Our framework enables us to see why such arguments are not valid. If a computational description
of a physical evolution can only be applied post-hoc, then the system has not acted as a computer.
Such descriptions may be used in the experiment and testing cycles for developing a system to use as
a computer, but if the final state of the system is needed in order to decide which calculation it has
run, the system is not being used to predict anything. In such situations the outcome of the abstract
computation needs to be known in advance in order to fit the computation to the physical evolution:
the physical evolution cannot then be used to give any further data. A post-hoc-only description
of computation also fails to predict as the representation needs to be adjusted in order to fit to the
computation, and different representations are frequently needed for each ‘instance of computation’.
For a true computer, a general representation for encoding and decoding of data is needed (that doesn’t
require post-hoc adjustment to make the computation work), and a relevant degree of predictability. A
computer is used to predict; the challenge then for non-standard computation is to demonstrate that
the theory of the device, and the representation of data within it, is known and stable enough to use
the physical device to predict the desired abstract computation.
Classical digital computers are highly-engineered silicon devices with an extremely well developed
physical theory in which we have a great deal of confidence. We are confident that we know what they
are doing during a computation, and can also predict how they will act in situations outside the usual
range. Scaling the system is a matter of correct composition of gates, about which we also have a well
developed and good theory. The digital nature of the computers is particularly useful, allowing systems
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on which long computations can run to be designed without having to cope with accumulation of smaller
errors. Despite all this confidence, hardware bugs do still occur, one well-known example being the
Intel Pentium floating point unit bug [44]. Technically, this was caused by a software bug that was then
frozen into the hardware design; the boundary between software and hardware is not sharp. Another
example is that of modern multi-core implementations which can exhibit unexpected behaviours: the
computational abstractions have not developed in step with the physical implementations [45].
In contrast to the highly-developed and scalable theories of classical computers, non-standard com-
puting devices generally have a theory that is much less well developed. This leads to problems of scale,
composition, and confidence that cast doubt on the use of a system as a computer. Amongst uncon-
ventional paradigms, quantum computing has the best characterised physical theory. As with classical
digital computers, quantum computers are highly engineered, with quantum states used to represent
“qubits”, the smallest unit of quantum information [2, 46]. Despite the excellent physical theory of
quantum mechanics available, however, there is still argument over whether certain specific systems are
truly implementing quantum computation. Consider, for example, the D-Wave machines [4, 47, 48].
Originally presented as implementing a relatively simple quantum annealing paradigm, the consensus
has shifted (not least within D-Wave itself) that this physical theory is not a good fit for predicting
the computational abilities of the machines. Work is now underway to characterise the devices at a
mathematical and phenomenological level, treating them as black boxes [49, 50].
This characterisation process crops up frequently in unconventional computing: rather than describing
all the physics, as with classical computing, outputs are matched to inputs mathematically. This
phenomenological theory can have predictive power (this input is taken to that output); however, the
fact that it is only phenomenological directly impacts on the degree of confidence with which the theory
is held. Without an underlying physical theory, a phenomenological theory has to do a lot more work
to convince that all relevant changes have been taken into account and that the computation can be
relied on. Furthermore, different sized systems must be characterised separately, as there is no scalable
underlying theory of the device. Without a reliable theory, in what way can the physical evolution of
the device predict the abstract evolution of the computation that is supposed to be being run?
In the end, the question of whether or not an unconventional system can be used as a computer
comes down to a simple question: what is the confidence that the abstract/physical diagram for the
computation commutes? Without this confidence, it is not computing. There are two options for what
is happening, based on the consequence of a mismatch between theory and physical system (i.e. a large
ǫ): if the conclusion is that the system must be re-designed then the system is being engineered; if
the theory of the fundamental dynamics is taken as at fault then what is happening is an experiment.
Either way, it is not computing.
Phenomenological models are widely used to develop new physical substrates for unconventional
computation, often by adapting devices originally designed for other purposes. In [51] a liquid crystal
display (LCD) was configured as a computational device not through engineering design, but through
the use of an evolutionary search algorithm to determine the correct configuration. As a consequence,
the physical model of the substrate is simply unknown. As before, one may develop a descriptive
physical model within the experimental domain, and exploit that model to compute within the domain,
possibly making use of continuity arguments. However, we cannot meaningfully compute with the
device outside that domain, since we have no means to extrapolate the model: the descriptive nature
of the physical model means the LCD device cannot be scaled with any confidence.
Another example of a purely descriptive physical model is slime moulds. These have, famously,
been used to compute minimal path lengths and other geometrical properties [52], but with no firm
understanding of the underlying physics/biology/chemistry. It is worth noting here that these examples,
of slime moulds and evolved LCD computing, help demonstrate that the physical computer does not
need to be intelligently designed: it can be naturally (or even computationally) evolved. Hence living
organisms of all sorts can potentially perform information processing, and can potentially be exploited
to perform their computations for us.
Another major problem arising from the use of such substrates for unconventional computation is
that of scaling. As we have seen, digital computers scale simply through composition of small elements;
slime moulds and LCD devices, however, scale by using bigger versions of the same system (this is also
arguably true of the D-Wave machine). With only a phenomenological model of performance, there is
no guarantee that a scaled-up system will act in the desired way. Even if some scaling behaviour is
found experimentally at smaller scales, it is notoriously difficult to project this to larger sizes.
Not all non-standard computing relies on phenomenological models. Sometimes unconventional de-
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vices do have a physical model behind them, but this is not in fact the actual physical behaviour
(especially at large scales). Soap films are often described as finding a minimum energy, minimum
length, state and thereby performing an analogue computation of minimal Steiner trees. However, soap
films do not always find minimal states [53]: it is, after all, the principle of stationary action, not mini-
mal action, and soap films, as with other physical systems, can and do get trapped in local minima. In
this case we have a bug in the physical implementation, not because it has been incorrectly engineered,
but because the underlying simplistic physical model is wrong.
One final note is that, even for unconventional substrates, the computational model C is often that
of classical boolean logic. There are only three computational models that claim universality: classical
Turing machines, quantum Turing machines [54], and the general purpose analogue computer [1]. Al-
though computation does not require universality, one interesting area of future research is to develop
novel computational models that can be implemented by engineered unconventional substrates. Un-
til then, we can use the framework developed here to distinguish when we are computing with novel
substrates and with what degree of confidence, and when we are performing experiments on them.
XII. CONCLUSION
We have developed a formal framework for computing, showing how the physical and abstract levels
of a computation connect through the representation relation. This relation is the same as governs
the interrelation of physical systems and their mathematical description in experimental science, and
is key to the scientific process. We have seen how physical science progresses through the experimental
realisation of diagrams that commute across the abstract/physical divide, allowing abstract theory to
predict the outcome of physical experiments. These diagrams then form the basis for our framework
for computation, where the physical evolution of a computer is used to find the outcome of an abstract
computation. We are able to use this framework to give conditions on when a physical system is
performing a computation: we require a good physical theory of the computer; representation that
allows the encoding and decoding of information; and at least one fundamental dynamical operation
(such as gates). The requirement for encoding and decoding to be present in the system leads to the
requirement that computational entities be present. Their job is physically to locate the representation
relation, which is required for physical computing rather than abstract computation. We saw that the
requirement for computational entities does not impact on the objective nature of the conditions for
computing. The definition is also broad, including biological, non-biological and artificial entities.
The range of potential applications of this framework is huge. Previously, discussion of whether a
system is a computer or not has been marked by a large amount of confusion and a correspondingly
small amount of consensus. There has simply not previously been the language in which to frame these
questions adequately, and to pick apart what is being discussed as an abstract computation, and what as
a physical computer. The framework we have presented, including its powerful diagrams, allows us now
to define precisely what is being asked. We have seen in this paper some of the first results from this new
expressive capability. Physical computing is seen as interacting at a very basic level with experimental
science; and we are able to show precisely, within the same framework, the processes of theoretical and
experimental science, computation, and engineering and the use of technology. One particular area at
the interface between science and computing is the simulation of physical systems by computers. This
is an area that often causes a large amount of confusion regarding what is being simulated and by
what, and how the simulation and the physical system are related. By locating simulation within our
framework, we showed straightforwardly how it relates to computation and theoretical predication, and
also how different types of simulation relate to each other. The interaction of different layers through
representation was again key: as well as the encoding/decoding operations needed for computing to be
occurring, simulation also requires the embedding of abstract models to be taking place. Without these
stages, simulation (even of a system of itself) does not occur. Bringing this clarity to such a previously
confusing area demonstrates the power of our approach.
Another area that this framework clarifies is that of unconventional computing devices. By con-
sidering the theory of the physical device and its limits, we showed that there is a strong danger of
misunderstanding what is taking place when these devices are used. It is often the case that the systems
are not being used as computers at all, when the theory has not been developed far enough for users
to be confident that computational diagrams will commute. In these cases, users are experimenting
on the devices, to develop their potential to act as computers, rather than using them to compute per
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se. This is now the challenge to researchers in non-standard computing: to develop their device theory
sufficiently that the elements within this framework are present in the system. Then it will be possible
to argue with much more confidence than previously that the system is in fact performing computation.
The implications of this formalism go wider even than this. The framework shows the interaction of
physical objects and the representations that we give them, in science, technology, and computing. By
formalising this relationship, we now have a precise language in which to describe and understand how
logical, mathematical, and computational structures interface with the physical objects of the world
around us. This is the language of computing as standing on the boundaries between the physical
theories of the underlying objects and interactions used, the technology that comes from engineering
systems, and the mathematics and logic of the abstract computation. The study of physical computing
has its own unique representation of physical systems and processes, and now has the foundational
formalism in which to describe and determine its own domain, and its relation to the physics, chemistry,
and biology of physical systems. Computer science takes its place as a natural science.
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